Verheggen on Davidson and Kripke on Rule-Following and Meaning
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 9687749 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Alexander Miller (0000-0003-2317-9800, University of Otago, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2020 |
| Volume | 59 |
| Issue | 2 |
| Pages | 207-217 |
| Publication date | 2020-06-01 |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Dialogue (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0012-2173 • E-ISSN: 1759-0949 |
| Publisher | Cambridge University Press (CUP) (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1017/s0012217320000049 |
| OpenAlex | W3082200376 |
| Language | EN |
| References cited | 9 |
This paper discusses Claudine Verheggen's account of what she takes to be Donald Davidson's response to the sceptical paradox about rule-following and meaning developed in Saul Kripke's interpretation of Wittgenstein's ‘rule-following considerations.’ It focusses on questions about the normativity of meaning, the social character of meaning, and the role of triangulation in Davidson's account of the determination of meaning, and invites Verheggen to compare the non-reductionism she finds in Davidson with that developed in Crispin Wright's judgement-dependent account of meaning
Epistemology · Interpretation (philosophy) · Judgement · Linguistics · Meaning (existential) · Skepticism · Wright · Computer Science · Philosophy · Philosophy and Theoretical Science · Pragmatism in Philosophy and Education · Wittgensteinian philosophy and applications
| Highly cited | No |
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