Against Kripke on Unrestricted Exportation
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 9687805 |
|---|---|
| Authors | SAJED TAYEBI (0000-0002-1035-860X, Institute for Research in Fundamental Sciences, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2020 |
| Volume | 59 |
| Issue | 1 |
| Pages | 145-156 |
| Publication date | 2020-03-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Dialogue (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0012-2173 • E-ISSN: 1759-0949 |
| Publisher | Cambridge University Press (CUP) (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1017/s0012217319000131 |
| OpenAlex | W2944451876 |
| Language | EN |
| References cited | 16 |
This paper defends the doctrine of Unrestricted Exportation (UE) against Saul Kripke’s attack on it. According to UE, the exportation step from the de dicto belief report, S believes that α is F, together with the premise that α exists, to the de re report, S believes of α that it is F, is valid. By presenting an alleged counterexample, Kripke tries to show that UE has much more implausible consequences than its advocates would accept. By going through the details of Kripke’s scenario, I argue that UE does not commit us to the consequences Kripke associates with it
Combinatorics · Commit · Counterexample · Doctrine · Economics · Epistemology · Exportation · Kripke structure · Law and economics · Mathematical economics · Premise · Theology · Artificial Intelligence · Computer Science · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Mathematics · Philosophy · Philosophy and Theoretical Science
Speaker's Reference and Semantic Reference
Quantifiers and Propositional Attitudes
XII—How to Measure the Standard Metre
Knowledge and belief
Some problems about belief
Quantifying in
Replies
Reference and Definite Descriptions
About De Re Belief
Contributions to Logic and Methodology in Honor of J. M. Bochenski
| Citation velocity | historical |
|---|---|
| Highly cited | No |