Beyond Logical Empiricism
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 9687870 |
|---|---|
| Authors | William R Shea (University of Ottawa, corresponding author) |
| Year | 1971 |
| Volume | 10 |
| Issue | 2 |
| Pages | 223-242 |
| Publication date | 1971-06-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Dialogue (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0012-2173 • E-ISSN: 1759-0949 |
| Publisher | Cambridge University Press (CUP) (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1017/s0012217300050022 |
| OpenAlex | W2148001256 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 1 |
| References cited | 6 |
The mainstream of the philosophy of science in the second quarter of this century—the so-called “logical empiricist” or “logical positivist” movement—assumed that theoretical language in science is parasitic upon observation language and can be eliminated from scientific discourse by disinterpretation and formalization, or by explicit definition in or reduction to observational language. But several fashionable views now place the onus on believers in an observation language to show how such a language is meaningful in the absence of a theory. In the present paper, I propose to show why logical positivism failed to do justice to the basic empirical and logical problems of philosophy of science. I also wish to consider why the drastic reaction, typified by Thomas Kuhn and Paul Feyerabend, fails t o provide a suitable alternative, and to suggest that the radical approaches of recent writers such as Mary Hesse and Dudley Shapere hold out a genuine promise of dealing effectively with the central tasks that face the philosopher of science today
Empiricism · Epistemology · Logical consequence · Logical positivism · Mainstream · Philosophy of language · Philosophy of science · Positivism · Sociology · Computer Science · Philosophy · Philosophy and History of Science · Philosophy, Science, and History · Science and Climate Studies
| Unique citing works | 1 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 0,08 |
| Citation span | 2014 - 2014 (1) |
| Citation velocity | historical |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 1 |