A New Puzzle about Believed Fallibility
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 9687933 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Yitzhak Benbaji (0000-0003-1472-3894, Bar-Ilan University, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2006 |
| Volume | 45 |
| Issue | 4 |
| Pages | 679-696 |
| Publication date | 2006-01-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Dialogue (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0012-2173 • E-ISSN: 1759-0949 |
| Publisher | Cambridge University Press (CUP) (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1017/s0012217300001232 |
| OpenAlex | W2005342023 |
| Language | EN |
| References cited | 17 |
I shall consider the phenomenon of believing ourselves to have at least one false belief: a phenomenon I call believed fallibility. I shall first present a paradoxical argument which appears to show that believed fallibility is incoherent; second, note that this argument assumes that we are committed to the conjunction of all our beliefs; third, sketch a more intuitive notion of commitment in which we are not committed to the conjunction of all our beliefs and argue that the original paradoxical argument is now defused; fourth, construct a new paradoxical argument showing that if we believe that we have at least one false belief we are committed to a contradiction, employing the preferable notion of commitment; and, fifth, suggest that perhaps we might avoid the new paradox by denying that closing our beliefs under conjunction is required by rationality
Argument (complex analysis) · Conjunction (astronomy) · Construct (python library) · Contradiction · Epistemology · Phenomenon · Rationality · Sketch · Computer Science · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Free Will and Agency · Philosophy · War, Ethics, and Justification
| Citation velocity | historical |
|---|---|
| Highly cited | No |