Bonjour's Objection to Traditional Foundationalism
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 9687946 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Steven Rappaport (De Anza College, corresponding author) |
| Year | 1989 |
| Volume | 28 |
| Issue | 3 |
| Pages | 433-448 |
| Publication date | 1989-01-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Dialogue (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0012-2173 • E-ISSN: 1759-0949 |
| Publisher | Cambridge University Press (CUP) (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1017/s001221730001595x |
| OpenAlex | W2151235104 |
| Language | EN |
| References cited | 6 |
Empirical foundationalism affirms that some empirical beliefs a person holds (at a time) have a degree of justification or warrant that does not derive from their being inferable from other empirical beliefs the person holds. Such beliefs are basic for the person (at the time). In his recent book Laurence Bonjour claims that foundationalism faces the following problem: The basic problem confronting empirical foundationalism ... is how the basic or foundational empirical beliefs to which it appeals are themselves justified or warranted or in some way given positive epistemic standing, while still preserving their status as basic. This problem amounts to a dilemma: if there is no justification, basic beliefs are rendered epistemically arbitrary, thereby fatally impugning the very claim of foundationalism to constitute a theory of epistemic justification; while a justification which appeals to further premises of some sort threatens to begin anew the regress of justification which it is the whole point of foundationalism to avoid
Dilemma · Economics · Epistemology · Foundationalism · Warrant · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Philosophy · Philosophy and History of Science · Philosophy and Theoretical Science
| Citation velocity | historical |
|---|---|
| Highly cited | No |