On the Aim of Scientific Theories in Relating to the World
A Defence of the Semantic Account
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 9688074 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Michael Baur (0000-0002-6468-1234, University of Toronto, corresponding author) |
| Year | 1990 |
| Volume | 29 |
| Issue | 3 |
| Pages | 323-334 |
| Publication date | 1990-01-01 |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Dialogue (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0012-2173 • E-ISSN: 1759-0949 |
| Publisher | Cambridge University Press (CUP) (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1017/s001221730001310x |
| OpenAlex | W2101990680 |
| Language | EN |
| References cited | 11 |
According to the received view of scientific theories, a scientific theory is an axiomatic-deductive linguistic structure which must include some set of guidelines (“correspondence rules”) for interpreting its theoretical terms with reference to the world of observable phenomena. According to the semantic view, a scientific theory need not be formulated as an axiomatic-deductive structure with correspondence rules, but need only specify models which are said to be “isomorphic” with actual phenomenal systems. In this paper, I consider both the received and semantic views as they bear on the issue of how a theory relates to the world (Section 1). Then I offer a critique of some arguments frequently put forth in support of the semantic view (Section 2). Finally, I suggest a more convincing “meta-methodological” argument (based on the thought of Bernard Lonergan) in favour of the semantic view (Section 3)
Argument (complex analysis) · Axiom · Axiomatic system · Epistemology · Scientific theory · Section (typography) · Semantic theory of truth · Set (abstract data type) · Computer Science · Mathematics · Philosophy · Philosophy and History of Science · Philosophy and Theoretical Science · Philosophy, Science, and History
| Highly cited | No |
|---|