Does God Know the Occurrence of a Change Among Particulars? Avicenna and the Problem of God’s Knowledge of Change

Bibliographic Data

ID9688103
AuthorsAMIRHOSSEIN ZADYOUSEFI (0000-0002-3061-2732, Tarbiat Modares University, corresponding author)
Year2019
Volume58
Issue4
Pages621-652
Publication date2019-12-01
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenueDialogue (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0012-2173 • E-ISSN: 1759-0949
PublisherCambridge University Press (CUP) (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1017/s0012217318000550
OpenAlexW2899434629
LanguageEN
Citations received6
References cited6

(i) God is omniscient; therefore, for any change, C, among particulars, God knows the occurrence of C. (ii) If God knows the occurrence of C, then X. (iii) not-X. It is clear that the set of propositions (i)—(iii) is inconsistent. This is the general form of two problems—which I call the ‘problem of change in knowledge’ (PCK) and the ‘problem of change in essence’ (PCE)—for Avicenna concerning God’s knowledge of particulars. No work in the secondary literature has discussed exactly what PCK and PCE are. In this paper, I will clarify exactly what they are

Epistemology · Set (abstract data type) · Theology · Computer Science · Families in Therapy and Culture · Historical, Religious, and Philosophical Studies · Medieval and Classical Philosophy · Philosophy

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