Belief and Cognitive Architecture
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 9688330 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Warren Ramsey (0000-0002-4073-379X, University of Notre Dame, corresponding author), William Ramsey |
| Year | 1992 |
| Volume | 31 |
| Issue | 1 |
| Pages | 115-120 |
| Publication date | 1992-01-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Dialogue (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0012-2173 • E-ISSN: 1759-0949 |
| Publisher | Cambridge University Press (CUP) (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1017/s0012217300048514 |
| OpenAlex | W2098175501 |
| Language | EN |
| References cited | 5 |
Considerable debate in philosophy of psychology has recently focussed upon two central themes. One concerns the ontological status of propositional attitudes like beliefs and desires, the other on the proper computational account of cognitive architecture. In the ontological debate, the two most prominent positions are eliminativism, which claims that commonsense psychology is false because there are no such things as beliefs and desires; and versions of intentional realism, which counters that beliefs and desires actually do exist in the mind/brain. In the cognitive architecture debate, there are again two outstanding views: classical cognitivism, which holds that cognition is something closely akin to symbol manipulation; and parallel distributed processing (or connectionism), which roughly maintains that cognition is the distributed activation of several simple, non-symbolic processing units. Furthermore, in spite of their different topics, the two debates have been linked by a number of authors who suggest that where you stand in the cognitive architecture debate should help determine where you stand in the debate over prepositional attitudes. So, for example, writers like Jerry Fodor have used the plausibility of classical cognitivism to defend a realist interpretation of propositional attitudes, while writers like Steve Stich and myself have argued that certain forms of connectionism support eliminativism
Cognition · Cognitive architecture · Cognitive science · Cognitivism (psychology) · Computational theory of mind · Connectionism · Eliminative materialism · Epistemology · Functionalism (philosophy of mind) · Metaphysics · Philosophy of mind · Qualia · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Philosophy · Philosophy and History of Science · Philosophy and Theoretical Science · Psychology
| Citation velocity | historical |
|---|---|
| Highly cited | No |