Une défense de l’approche simulationniste du souvenir épisodique

Bibliographic Data

ID9688381
AuthorsDenis Perrin (0000-0002-3206-0345, Université Grenoble Alpes, corresponding author)
Year2011
Volume50
Issue1
Pages39-76
Publication date2011-03-01
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenueDialogue (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0012-2173 • E-ISSN: 1759-0949
PublisherCambridge University Press (CUP) (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1017/s0012217311000114
OpenAlexW2015492025
LanguageFR
References cited28

In this paper, I carry out an application of the debate between simulationism and theory theory to the issue of episodic memory. I first criticize the approach favored by the theory theory. Then I advance a simulationist conception of the relationship between the phenomenology of episodic memory and its specific kind of self-consciousness. On my view, subjectivity belongs to the very content of episodic memory, not as an element of its content, but as the perspective it gives to the content that makes the simulation of past experience possible. In support of that view, I provide an analysis inspired by J. Perry of the semantics of de se thought. It gives the remembering subject a non-representational presence in the mnesic content

Cognition · Cognitive psychology · Cognitive science · Consciousness · Content (measure theory) · Episodic memory · Epistemology · Perspective (graphical) · Phenomenology (philosophy) · Subject (documents) · Subjectivity · Artificial Intelligence · Computer Science · Philosophy · Philosophy and Theoretical Science · Psychology · Semiotics and Representation Studies · Social Representations and Identity

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