The Authority of Expressive Self-Ascriptions

Dados Bibliográficos

ID9688534
AutoresA Nguyen (0000-0002-1511-3089, Eastern Kentucky University, autor correspondente), A Minh Nguyen
Ano2008
Volume47
Fascículo1
Páginas103-136
Data de publicação2008-01-01
Peer ReviewedSim
Open AccessSim
TipoARTICLE
PeriódicoDialogue (JOURNAL)
Identificadores do periódicoISSN: 0012-2173 • E-ISSN: 1759-0949
EditoraCambridge University Press (CUP) (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1017/s0012217300002407
OpenAlexW2017664461
IdiomaEN
Citações recebidas3
Referências citadas29

What explains first-person authority? What explains the presumption that an utterance is true when it is a sincere intelligible determinate first-person singular simple present-tense ascription of intentional state? According to Rockney Jacobsen, self-ascriptions each enjoy a presumption of truth because they are systematically reliable. They are systematically reliable because they are typically both truth-assessable and expressive. Such self-ascriptions, if sincere, are certain to be true. This article presents a defence and a critique of Jacobsen's theory. It is argued that the purported prevalence of expressive self-ascriptions is at best contingent. This contingency cannot explain why self-ascriptions are necessarily authoritative

Ascription · Contingency · Defeasible estate · Epistemology · Linguistics · Political science · Presumption · Simple (philosophy) · Speech act · Utterance · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Free Will and Agency · Law · Philosophy · Philosophy and Theoretical Science · Psychology · Social Psychology