Anscombe, Sensation and Intentional Objects
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 9688632 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Douglas Odegard (University of Guelph, corresponding author) |
| Year | 1972 |
| Volume | 11 |
| Issue | 1 |
| Pages | 69-77 |
| Publication date | 1972-03-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Dialogue (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0012-2173 • E-ISSN: 1759-0949 |
| Publisher | Cambridge University Press (CUP) (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1017/s0012217300028390 |
| OpenAlex | W2125387042 |
| Language | EN |
| References cited | 4 |
Let us use ‘sensation’ such that we can talk about ‘visual sensation’ and ‘auditory sensation’, and such that ‘sensation’ cannot readily be pluralized (cf. ‘intelligence’, ‘imagination’). It then makes sense to talk about the “objects” involved in sensation. For example, if someone sees red, where his seeing red is a case of sensation, then there is an “object” involved in the situation in the sense that we can talk about “what” he sees. One of the enduring problems in philosophy is to try to determine the status of such objects
Aesthetics · Cognitive psychology · Cognitive science · Object (grammar) · Sensation · Artificial Intelligence · Computer Science · Philosophy · Philosophy and Theoretical Science · Psychology
| Citation velocity | historical |
|---|---|
| Highly cited | No |