A Sceptical Rejoinder to Sensitivity-Contextualism
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 9688711 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Peter Murphy (0000-0001-8459-4448) |
| Year | 2005 |
| Volume | 44 |
| Issue | 4 |
| Pages | 693-706 |
| Publication date | 2005-01-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Dialogue (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0012-2173 • E-ISSN: 1759-0949 |
| Publisher | Cambridge University Press (CUP) (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1017/s0012217300000044 |
| OpenAlex | W2096558920 |
| Language | EN |
| References cited | 9 |
This article offers a novel sceptical argument that the sensitivity-contextualist must say is sound; moreover, she must say that the conclusion of this argument is true at ordinary standards. The view under scrutiny has it that in different contexts knowledge-attributing sentences express different propositions, propositions which differ in the stretch of worlds across which the subject is required to track the truth. I identify the underlying reason for the sceptical result and argue that it makes sensitivity-contextualism irremediably flawed. Contextualists, I conclude, should abandon sensitivity for some other piece of epistemic machinery
Argument (complex analysis) · Contextualism · Epistemology · Linguistics · Scrutiny · Skepticism · Subject (documents) · Computer Science · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Feminist Epistemology and Gender Studies · Medicine · Philosophy · Philosophy and Theoretical Science
| Citation velocity | historical |
|---|---|
| Highly cited | No |