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Presuppositions in Bradley's Philosophy

Bibliographic Data

ID9688768
AuthorsD L C MacLachlan (Queen's University, corresponding author)
Year1963
Volume2
Issue2
Pages155-169
Publication date1963-09-01
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenueDialogue (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0012-2173 • E-ISSN: 1759-0949
PublisherCambridge University Press (CUP) (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1017/s001221730004381x
OpenAlexW2032758856
LanguageEN

Bradley always claimed that he was essentially a sceptic; and the fate of Appearance and Reality has been such that this claim should be conceded by every good empiricist. For does not Hume himself declare that sceptical arguments are arguments that “admit of no answer and produce no conviction”? To suggest that all Bradley's arguments fall precisely into this category is certainly to exaggerate, but the fact remains that on the one hand, many criticisms of Bradley have missed their mark, because the opponent has been under-estimated and misunderstood, while on the other hand, Bradley had few disciples and made few converts, even at a time when the philosophical climate was more favourable and less rigorous than it is today

Adversary · Conviction · Empiricism · Epistemology · Political science · Presupposition · Skepticism · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Law · Mathematics · Philosophy · Philosophy and Theoretical Science

Highly citedNo

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