On Gibbard’s Defence of the Dispositional Theory of Meaning
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 9689305 |
|---|---|
| Authors | ALI SABOOHI (0000-0003-0496-7043, Institute for Research in Fundamental Sciences, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2019 |
| Volume | 58 |
| Issue | 3 |
| Pages | 513-525 |
| Publication date | 2019-09-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Dialogue (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0012-2173 • E-ISSN: 1759-0949 |
| Publisher | Cambridge University Press (CUP) (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1017/s0012217318000422 |
| OpenAlex | W2886603406 |
| Language | EN |
| References cited | 8 |
According to the dispositional theory of meaning and content, what a speaker means by an expression is determined by her dispositions to use it. The literature contains two well-known objections against this theory: the problem of finitude and the problem of error. In his book Meaning and Normativity , Allan Gibbard propounds a novel defence against these objections. In this paper, I argue that Gibbard’s suggestions fail to save the dispositional theory. Moreover, I argue that Gibbard’s deflationary view about facts prevents him from saying anything about the property of meaning that would hold any interest for a naturalist
Content (measure theory) · Epistemology · Expression (computer science) · Meaning (existential) · Naturalism · Property (philosophy) · Computer Science · Historical Philosophy and Science · Mathematics · Medieval and Classical Philosophy · Philosophy · Philosophy and Theoretical Science
| Citation velocity | historical |
|---|---|
| Highly cited | No |