Reason's Rule and Vulgar Wrong-Doing
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 9689532 |
|---|---|
| Authors | J R S Wilson, John Wilson (0000-0001-8488-3020, University of Edinburgh, corresponding author) |
| Year | 1977 |
| Volume | 16 |
| Issue | 4 |
| Pages | 591-604 |
| Publication date | 1977-12-01 |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Dialogue (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0012-2173 • E-ISSN: 1759-0949 |
| Publisher | Cambridge University Press (CUP) (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1017/s0012217300026007 |
| OpenAlex | W2057230591 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 1 |
| References cited | 4 |
Socrates argues in the Republic that a certain condition of soul is both best for its possessor and the source of just or right action towards others. He calls this condition ‘justice’, but in order not to beg the question I shall refer to it as the prescribed condition. I shall not be concerned in this paper with the first half of Socrates' thesis, but only with the way the prescribed condition of soul expresses itself in action. A number of questions arise here, for Socrates' conception of just action extends beyond the common understanding to include the performance of that social function for which one is fitted by nature. I shall disregard this extension, however, and restrict myself to one crucial question: what grounds are there of a non-analogical kind for the assertion that a person whose soul is in the prescribed condition will never act in a way which would be agreed by Socrates and the vulgar to be wrong
Action (physics) · Assertion · Economic Justice · Economics · Epistemology · Extension (predicate logic) · Order (exchange) · Physics · Political science · SOCRATES · Soul · Classical Philosophy and Thought · Computer Science · Ethics in medical practice · Law · Philosophical Ethics and Theory · Philosophy
| Citations per year | 0.03 |
|---|---|
| Citation span | 1995 - 1995 (1) |
| Highly cited | No |