A Reconstruction of Korsgaard on Autonomy’s Objective Value in Light of Sangiovanni, Guyer, and Langton

Bibliographic Data

ID9689552
AuthorsEkin Erkan (0000-0001-7888-4449, University of Cincinnati, corresponding author)
Year2025
Pages1-21
Publication date2025-09-04
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenueDialogue (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0012-2173 • E-ISSN: 1759-0949
PublisherCambridge University Press (CUP) (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1017/s0012217325100772
OpenAlexW4414000716
LanguageEN
References cited33

Christine Korsgaard avers that the value we place on specific personal choices — understood as goals or ends — involves committing to them, or forming a care, which is itself conditioned by the value-conferring ability of the valuer. In other words, personal autonomy implies the objective value of the agent’s autonomous choosing and their coeval cares projects. Commentators like Andrea Sangiovanni, Paul Guyer, and Rae Langton criticize Korsgaard’s commitment-based conception of autonomous choosing. This article reviews these objections and then proposes a modified Korsgaardian framework concerning the objective value of autonomous choosing, which, I propose, avoids these critical objections

Aesthetics · Autonomy · Political science · Psychoanalysis · Value (mathematics) · Computer Science · Free Will and Agency · Philosophical Ethics and Theory · Philosophy · Philosophy and Theoretical Science · Psychology