Annas
Virtuous Person, Relativism, and the Circularity Objection
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 9689761 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Husain Sarkar (Louisiana State University, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2015 |
| Volume | 54 |
| Issue | 2 |
| Pages | 285-311 |
| Publication date | 2015-06-01 |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Dialogue (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0012-2173 • E-ISSN: 1759-0949 |
| Publisher | Cambridge University Press (CUP) (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1017/s001221731500027x |
| OpenAlex | W2088151566 |
| Language | EN |
| References cited | 21 |
This paper is informed by two principles: the Partiality Principle and the Impartiality Principle. Relying upon a relatively-unknown argument in Kant, the latter principle is stated and defended. The former principle is shown to be connected to Annas’ claim, in her theory of virtue ethics, that no mature, responsible adult wants to be told what to do, as well as to her developmental account of teaching and learning of virtue. I argue that Annas’ theory of virtue ethics is susceptible, as Kant’s theory is not, either to the Circularity Objection or (inclusive) to the Relativism Objection
Argument (complex analysis) · Epistemic virtue · Epistemology · Impartiality · Moral relativism · Relativism · Virtue · Virtue ethics · Free Will and Agency · Philosophical Ethics and Theory · Philosophy · Political Philosophy and Ethics
| Highly cited | No |
|---|