The Objects of Knowledge and Belief
Some Linguistic Considerations
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 9689787 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Stanley Munsat (University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, corresponding author) |
| Year | 1977 |
| Volume | 16 |
| Issue | 4 |
| Pages | 575-590 |
| Publication date | 1977-12-01 |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Dialogue (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0012-2173 • E-ISSN: 1759-0949 |
| Publisher | Cambridge University Press (CUP) (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1017/s0012217300025993 |
| OpenAlex | W2098550338 |
| Language | EN |
| References cited | 1 |
In Chapter V of Res Cogitans , Zeno Vendler argues that any analysis of “x knows that p” that has “x believes that p” in the analysans is incorrect. The reason he gives is that the “that p” in “x knows that p” is not the same grammatical object as the “that p” in “x believes that p”. As Vendler puts it, there are thats and thats. The view that there are two kinds of “that” clause, one which follows “know” and another which follows “believe”, is attacked by O.R. Jones in his article “Can One Believe What One Knows?”
Epistemology · Linguistics · Object (grammar) · Zeno's paradoxes · Classical Philosophy and Thought · Computer Science · Mathematics · Philosophy
| Highly cited | No |
|---|