Can a Thought's Whole Subject-Matter Be Itself? The Case of Pain
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 9690481 |
|---|---|
| Authors | D Goldstick (0000-0002-6513-0346, University of Toronto, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2024 |
| Volume | 63 |
| Issue | 1 |
| Pages | 139-145 |
| Publication date | 2024-04-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Dialogue (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0012-2173 • E-ISSN: 1759-0949 |
| Publisher | Cambridge University Press (CUP) (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1017/s001221732300029x |
| OpenAlex | W4387120749 |
| Language | EN |
| References cited | 6 |
Even if it cannot be found elsewhere, it does at least appear that logical infallibility, or incorrigibility, can be found in the belief that one is, or is not, in pain, as well as in the Cogito. But how could the existence of a (true) belief and the existence of the fact believed be the same existence? An answer is proposed. Sometimes a belief can be a desire
Cogito ergo sum · Epistemology · Infallibility · Subject (documents) · Subject matter · Classical Philosophy and Thought · Computer Science · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Philosophy · Philosophy and Theoretical Science · Psychology
| Citation velocity | historical |
|---|---|
| Highly cited | No |