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The First-Person Perspective Is Not a Defining Feature of Consciousness

Bibliographic Data

ID9690487
AuthorsDylan Ludwig (0000-0002-7019-693X, York University, corresponding author)
Year2021
Volume60
Issue3
Pages435-446
Publication date2021-12-01
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenueDialogue (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0012-2173 • E-ISSN: 1759-0949
PublisherCambridge University Press (CUP) (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1017/s0012217321000196
OpenAlexW4226152122
LanguageEN
References cited48

Philosophers and scientists generally assume that consciousness is characterized by a ‘first-person perspective.’ On one interpretation of this claim, experiences are defined, at least in part, by representations that encode a subject-centred ‘point of view.’ But claims about the defining features of consciousness must be sensitive to the possibility of dissociation: if a neurobiological structure or psychological function is neither necessary nor sufficient for consciousness, it cannot be a defining feature in any robust sense. I appeal to research on unconscious emotion, visually guided action, perceptual constancy, and psychiatric disorder to argue that first-personal representations dissociate from conscious experience

Action (physics) · Appeal · Cognitive psychology · Cognitive science · Consciousness · Dissociation (chemistry) · Epistemology · Interpretation (philosophy) · Perception · Perspective (graphical) · Psychoanalysis · Subject (documents) · Unconscious mind · Artificial Intelligence · Computer Science · Embodied and Extended Cognition · Mental Health and Psychiatry · Philosophy · Psychology · Psychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment · Social Psychology

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Highly citedNo

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