Common Knowledge and Davis's Argument from Symmetry in the Prisoner's Dilemma
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 9690534 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Richard Reiner (University of Toronto, corresponding author) |
| Year | 1995 |
| Volume | 34 |
| Issue | 2 |
| Pages | 281-294 |
| Publication date | 1995-01-01 |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Dialogue (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0012-2173 • E-ISSN: 1759-0949 |
| Publisher | Cambridge University Press (CUP) (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1017/s0012217300014712 |
| OpenAlex | W2036620847 |
| Language | EN |
| References cited | 10 |
Lawrence H. Davis (1977, 1985) has formulated and defended a version of the argument from symmetry for the non-iterated Prisoner's Dilemma that attempts to show that under certain conditions the rationally prescribed course of action in this game is co-operation. The argument runs as follows below. (I have prefixed a ‘D’ to each of Davis's numbers here, and in subsequent references, in order to avoid confusion as I refer to his points.)
Action (physics) · Argument (complex analysis) · Confusion · Dilemma · Economics · Epistemology · Iterated function · Mathematical economics · Order (exchange) · Physics · Prisoner's dilemma · Psychoanalysis · Superrationality · Symmetry (geometry) · Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation · Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies · Game Theory and Applications · Mathematics · Philosophy · Psychology
| Highly cited | No |
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