Probabilité conditionnelle et certitude
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 9690801 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Bas C Van Fraassen (Princeton University, corresponding author) |
| Year | 1997 |
| Volume | 36 |
| Issue | 1 |
| Pages | 69-90 |
| Publication date | 1997-01-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Dialogue (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0012-2173 • E-ISSN: 1759-0949 |
| Publisher | Cambridge University Press (CUP) (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1017/s0012217300009306 |
| OpenAlex | W1965022651 |
| Language | FR |
| References cited | 14 |
Personal probability is now a familiar subject in epistemology, together with such more venerable notions as knowledge and belief. But there are severe strains between probability and belief; if either is taken as the more basic, the other may suffer. After explaining the difficulties of attempts to accommodate both, I shall propose a unified account which takes conditional personal probability as basic. Full belief is therefore a defined, derivative notion. Yet we will still be able to picture opinion as follows: my subjective probability is only a grading of the possibilities left open by my beliefs. My conditional probabilities generally derive — in a sense to be explicated — from the strongest belief I can maintain when admitting the relevant condition
Conditional probability · Epistemology · Statistics · Subject (documents) · Computer Science · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Logic, Reasoning, and Knowledge · Mathematics · Philosophy · Philosophy and History of Science
| Citation velocity | historical |
|---|---|
| Highly cited | No |