Suspense
Dynamic Incentives in Sports Contests
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 9703047 |
|---|---|
| Authors | William Chan (0000-0001-6205-255X, University of Hong Kong), Pascal Courty (0000-0002-9454-090X, European University Institute), Hao Li (0000-0001-5192-5458, University of Toronto), Li Hao (0000-0002-7212-557X, University of Toronto) |
| Year | 2009 |
| Volume | 119 |
| Issue | 534 |
| Pages | 24-46 |
| Publication date | 2009-01-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | The Economic Journal (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0013-0133 • E-ISSN: 1468-0297 |
| Publisher | Oxford University Press (OUP) (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1111/j.1468-0297.2008.02204.x |
| OpenAlex | W2141855083 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 2 |
| References cited | 18 |
In a dynamic model of sports competition, if spectators care only about contestants'efforts, incentive schemes depending linearly on the final score difference dominate rank order schemes based only on who wins. If spectators also care about suspense, defined as valuing more contestants' efforts when the game is closer, rank order schemes can dominate linear score difference schemes, and this will be the case when the demand for suspense is sufficiently high. Under additional assumptions, we show that the optimal rank order scheme dominates a broad class of incentive schemes. © The Author(s). Journal compilation © 2009 by the Royal Economic Society
Advertising · Business · Class (philosophy · Combinatorics · Competition (biology · Economics · Incentive · Mathematical economics · Microeconomics · Order (exchange · Rank (graph theory · Scheme (mathematics · Computer Science · Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies · Gambling Behavior and Treatments · Mathematics · Sports Analytics and Performance
| Unique citing works | 2 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 0,18 |
| Citation span | 2015 - 2025 (11) |
| Citation velocity | recent |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 2 |