Wage Interactions

Comparisons or Fall-Back Options

Datos Bibliográficos

ID9703084
AutoresJennifer C Smith (0000-0002-5116-1336, Bank of England, autor de correspondencia)
Año1996
Volumen106
Número435
Páginas495
Fecha de publicación1996-03-01
Peer ReviewedSí
Open AccessNo
TipoARTICLE
RevistaThe Economic Journal (JOURNAL)
Identificadores de la revistaISSN: 0013-0133 • E-ISSN: 1468-0297
EditorialOxford University Press (OUP) (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.2307/2235263
OpenAlexW2170499545
IdiomaEN
Referencias citadas8

This paper examines the role played by wage comparisons in pay bargaining when workers have a fall-back option. The effect on wages due to wage comparisons can be difficult to distinguish from the effect of the fall-back wage. It is shown that the use of wages of a recognised ‘pay leader' resolves this problem. The empirical work employs a unique panel of data covering 321 unionised bargaining units in the UK chemicals industry between 1978 and 1989. Results support anecdotal reports of pay leadership and suggest that wages elsewhere matter because comparisons are important to workers. In this sense, the results support the notion that ‘fairness considerations' drive wage interactions

Collective bargaining · Economics · Efficiency wage · Labour economics · Wage · Wage bargaining · Work (physics · Engineering · Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies · Labor market dynamics and wage inequality · Labor Movements and Unions