A Theory of Distributional Conflict, Voluntarism and Segregation
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 9704018 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Ignatius J Horstmann (University of Toronto and Institute for Policy Analysis), Kimberley A Scharf (University of Warwick, Institute for Fiscal Studies and CEPR), Kimberley Scharf (0000-0002-3963-0777, Institute for Fiscal Studies) |
| Year | 2008 |
| Volume | 118 |
| Issue | 527 |
| Pages | 427-453 |
| Publication date | 2008-03-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | The Economic Journal (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0013-0133 • E-ISSN: 1468-0297 |
| Publisher | Oxford University Press (OUP) (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1111/j.1468-0297.2007.02128.x |
| OpenAlex | W1982142008 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 2 |
| References cited | 28 |
Along with the rise in income inequality in the US, there is evidence of a simultaneous move towards fiscal devolution and increased government reliance on private provision of public goods. This article argues that these phenomena are related. We describe a model of jurisdiction and policy formation in which the structure of government provision is endogenous and public good provision levels are determined by a political process that can exploit private motives for voluntary giving. The model predicts that an increase in income inequality leads to decentralisation, with local jurisdictions becoming more income-homogeneous than the population as a whole. This reduction in local income heterogeneity, combined with a reduced tax base, results in increased reliance by government on private provision. Copyright © 2008 The Author(s)
Decentralization · Economic inequality · Economics · Government (linguistics · Inequality · Jurisdiction · Market economy · Microeconomics · Political science · Politics · Population · Public economics · Public good · Voluntarism (philosophy · Fiscal Policy and Economic Growth · Gender, Labor, and Family Dynamics · Local Government Finance and Decentralization
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A Model of Political Competition with Citizen-Candidates
The private provision of a public good is independent of the distribution of income
On the Number and Size of Nations
The Breakup of Nations
Pareto optimal redistribution and private charity
The Nonprofit Economy
Equilibrium and Local Redistribution in an Urban Economy when Households Differ in both Preferences and Incomes
Household Location and Tiebout
Estimating Equilibrium Models of Local Jurisdictions
A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures
The Effects of Property Taxes and Local Public Spending on Property Values
The Effects of Property Taxes and Local Public Spending on Property Values
A Search for Testable Implications of the Tiebout Hypothesis
Impure Altruism and Donations to Public Goods
On the private provision of public goods
| Unique citing works | 2 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 0,25 |
| Citation span | 2018 - 2026 (9) |
| Citation velocity | current |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 2 |