Unions and Efficient Training

Datos Bibliográficos

ID9704320
AutoresAlison L Booth (0000-0003-2237-5279, University of Essex), Monojit Chatterji (University of Dundee)
Año1998
Volumen108
Número447
Páginas328-343
Fecha de publicación1998-03-01
Peer ReviewedSí
Open AccessSí
TipoARTICLE
RevistaThe Economic Journal (JOURNAL)
Identificadores de la revistaISSN: 0013-0133 • E-ISSN: 1468-0297
EditorialOxford University Press (OUP) (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1111/1468-0297.00290
OpenAlexW2170620849
IdiomaEN
Citas recibidas11
Referencias citadas1

The paper examines the optimal level of training investment when trained workers are mobile, wage contracts are time‐consistent, and training comprises both specific and general skills. The firm has ex post monopsonistic power that drives trained workers' wages below the social optimum. The emergence of a trade union bargaining at the firm‐level can increase social welfare, by counterbalancing the firm's ex post monopsonistic power in wage determination. Local union‐firm wage bargaining ensures that the post‐training wage is set sufficiently high to deter at least some quits, so that the number of workers the firm trains is nearer the social optimum

Bargaining power · Business · Economics · Ex-ante · Investment (military · Labour economics · Market economy · Microeconomics · Monopsony · Political science · Politics · Power (physics · Social Welfare · Training (meteorology · Wage · Wage bargaining · Welfare · Labor market dynamics and wage inequality · Labor Movements and Unions · Merger and Competition Analysis