Monopsony and the Wage Effects of Migration

Datos Bibliográficos

ID9704587
AutoresMichael Amior (Hebrew University of Jerusalem), Alan Manning (0000-0002-7884-3580, Centre for Economic Performance & London School of Economics)
Año2025
Fecha de publicación2025-07-08
Peer ReviewedSí
Open AccessSí
TipoARTICLE
RevistaThe Economic Journal (JOURNAL)
Identificadores de la revistaISSN: 0013-0133 • E-ISSN: 1468-0297
EditorialOxford University Press (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1093/ej/ueaf053
OpenAlexW3044596204
IdiomaEN
Citas recibidas1
Referencias citadas80

If labour markets are competitive, migration can only affect native wages via marginal products. But under imperfect competition, migration may also increase wage mark-downs—if firms have greater monopsony power over migrants than natives, but cannot perfectly wage discriminate. While marginal products depend on relative labour supplies across skill cells, mark-downs depend on migrant concentration within them. This insight can help rationalise empirical violations of canonical migration models. Using US data, we conclude that migration does increase mark-downs: this expands aggregate native income, but redistributes it from workers to firms. Policies which constrain monopsony power over migrants can mitigate these adverse wage effects

Competition (biology · Economics · Immigration · Labour economics · Microeconomics · Monopsony · Wage · Global trade and economics · Labor market dynamics and wage inequality · Migration and Labor Dynamics