Explaining Focal Points
Cognitive Hierarchy Theory versus Team Reasoning
Datos Bibliográficos
| ID | 9704941 |
|---|---|
| Autores | Nicholas Bardsley (0000-0003-1181-4432, University of Southampton), Judith Mehta (University of East Anglia), Chris Starmer (0000-0001-7705-0127, University of Nottingham), Robert Sugden (0000-0002-3401-3139, University of East Anglia) |
| Año | 2010 |
| Volumen | 120 |
| Número | 543 |
| Páginas | 40-79 |
| Fecha de publicación | 2010-03-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Sí |
| Open Access | Sí |
| Tipo | ARTICLE |
| Revista | The Economic Journal (JOURNAL) |
| Identificadores de la revista | ISSN: 0013-0133 • E-ISSN: 1468-0297 |
| Editorial | Oxford University Press (OUP) (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1111/j.1468-0297.2009.02304.x |
| OpenAlex | W2078806543 |
| Idioma | EN |
| Citas recibidas | 24 |
| Referencias citadas | 22 |
This article reports experimental tests of two alternative explanations of how players use focal points to select equilibria in one-shot coordination games. Cognitive hierarchy theory explains coordination as the result of common beliefs about players' pre-reflective inclinations towards the relevant strategies; the theory of team reasoning explains it as the result of the players' using a non-standard form of reasoning. We report two experiments. One finds strong support for team reasoning; the other supports cognitive hierarchy theory. In the light of additional questionnaire evidence, we conclude that players' reasoning is sensitive to the decision context. Copyright © The Author(s). Journal compilation © Royal Economic Society 2009
Cognition · Cognitive psychology · Context (archaeology · Economics · Hierarchy · Shot (pellet · Computer Science · Decision-Making and Behavioral Economics · Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies · Game Theory and Applications · Psychology
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| Obras citantes distintas | 24 |
|---|---|
| Citas por año | 1,5 |
| Intervalo de citas | 2010 - 2026 (17) |
| Velocidad de citación | current |
| Altamente citado | No |
| Tipos de cita | Neutras: 23 |