Uncertainty, Electoral Incentives and Political Myopia

Datos Bibliográficos

ID9705340
AutoresAlessandra Bonfiglioli (0000-0002-2165-0067, Institute for Economic Analysis (CSIC) and Barcelona GSE), Gino Gancia (0000-0002-9375-261X, CREI and Barcelona GSE)
Año2013
Volumen123
Número568
Páginas373-400
Fecha de publicación2013-05-01
Peer ReviewedSí
Open AccessSí
TipoARTICLE
RevistaThe Economic Journal (JOURNAL)
Identificadores de la revistaISSN: 0013-0133 • E-ISSN: 1468-0297
EditorialOxford University Press (OUP) (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1111/ecoj.12029
OpenAlexW2068109353
IdiomaEN
Citas recibidas17
Referencias citadas46

We study the determinants of political myopia in a rational model of electoral accountability with informational frictions and uncertainty. When politicians' ability is ex ante unknown and policy choices are unobservable, elections improve political accountability and selection. However, incumbents underinvest in costly policies with future returns to signal high ability and increase re-election probability. Surprisingly, uncertainty reduces political myopia and may increase social welfare. We also address the socially optimal political rewards and the desirability of a one-term limit. Our predictions are consistent with several stylised facts and with a new empirical observation: aggregate uncertainty is positively correlated with fiscal discipline

Accountability · Econometrics · Economics · Ex-ante · Incentive · Macroeconomics · Market economy · Microeconomics · Political science · Politics · Public economics · Unobservable · Welfare · Electoral Systems and Political Participation · Fiscal Policies and Political Economy · Fiscal Policy and Economic Growth