Unforeseen Contingency and Renegotiation with Asymmetric Information
Datos Bibliográficos
| ID | 9705355 |
|---|---|
| Autores | Jihong Lee (0000-0002-7889-4935, Birkbeck College London and Yonsei University, autor de correspondencia) |
| Año | 2008 |
| Volumen | 118 |
| Número | 528 |
| Páginas | 678-694 |
| Fecha de publicación | 2008-04-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Sí |
| Open Access | Sí |
| Tipo | ARTICLE |
| Revista | The Economic Journal (JOURNAL) |
| Identificadores de la revista | ISSN: 0013-0133 • E-ISSN: 1468-0297 |
| Editorial | Oxford University Press (OUP) (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1111/j.1468-0297.2008.02137.x |
| OpenAlex | W2157743343 |
| Idioma | EN |
| Referencias citadas | 15 |
This article considers a buyer-seller contracting model in which the seller possesses private information about all relevant aspects of the state of nature, including how much each action is worth to the buyer. I argue that, given asymmetric information, the buyer may not entirely dismiss an unforeseen contingency claim by the seller. Then, if the buyer lacks the foresight/awareness to 'expect the unexpected', the model admits an equilibrium in which a seemingly complete contract is written and then renegotiated along its outcome path to generate inefficiency "ex post". Copyright © 2008 The Author(s)
Action (physics · Business · Computer security · Contingency · Economics · Futures studies · Inefficiency · Information asymmetry · Microeconomics · Outcome (game theory · Private information retrieval · Auction Theory and Applications · Computer Science · Law, Economics, and Judicial Systems · Legal and Constitutional Studies
| Velocidad de citación | historical |
|---|---|
| Altamente citado | No |