Political Dynasties, Electoral Institutions and Politicians’ Human Capital

Datos Bibliográficos

ID9705838
AutoresBenny Geys (0000-0003-4524-1820, BI Norwegian Business School, autor de correspondencia)
Año2017
Volumen127
Número605
PáginasF474-F494
Fecha de publicación2017-10-01
Peer ReviewedSí
Open AccessSí
TipoARTICLE
RevistaThe Economic Journal (JOURNAL)
Identificadores de la revistaISSN: 0013-0133 • E-ISSN: 1468-0297
EditorialOxford University Press (OUP) (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1111/ecoj.12444
OpenAlexW2765895323
IdiomaEN
Citas recibidas17
Referencias citadas44

This article focuses on political dynasties’ potential consequences, and particularly investigates whether and when they lead to the selection of dynastic politicians with relatively lower education levels. I exploit the different electoral constraints faced by distinct subsets of Italian local politicians to identify whether weaker constraints on political selection processes induce the selection of dynastic politicians with lower education levels relative to their non‐dynastic peers. The analysis – which covers almost 540,000 Italian local politicians active during the period 1985–2012 – indicates that a political selection process controlled by politicians rather than the electorate favours dynastic individuals with relatively lower levels of education

Capital (architecture · Economics · Exploit · Geography · Human capital · Market economy · Political capital · Political economy · Political process · Political science · Politics · Selection (genetic algorithm · Culture, Economy, and Development Studies · Law · Political Influence and Corporate Strategies · Social Policy and Reform Studies