Governance Reform in Legal Service Markets
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 9706064 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Paul A Grout (University of Bristol), Ian Jewitt (Nuffield College, Oxford), Silvia Sonderegger (0000-0001-8856-449X, University of Bristol) |
| Year | 2007 |
| Volume | 117 |
| Issue | 519 |
| Pages | C93-C113 |
| Publication date | 2007-03-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | The Economic Journal (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0013-0133 • E-ISSN: 1468-0297 |
| Publisher | Oxford University Press (OUP) (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1111/j.1468-0297.2007.02037.x |
| OpenAlex | W2100293417 |
| Language | EN |
| References cited | 10 |
This paper discusses proposed governance reforms of legal services markets. The model distinguishes between a status quo position supported by a system of professionally enforced collective reputation and forms of governance based more squarely on market mechanisms. We identify a number of forces which determine the success of reform. Focussing particularly on the rent recapture and relationship substitution effects, we highlight their impact on client welfare and quality of legal services in different types of market according to whether clients are transient or repeated users of the service
Business · Corporate governance · Economics · Legal service · Market economy · Political science · Position (finance · Public economics · Quality (philosophy · Reputation · Status quo · Welfare · Accounting · Corporate Finance and Governance · Finance · Law · Law, Economics, and Judicial Systems · Occupational and Professional Licensing Regulation
Non-Contractual Relations in Business
A Theory of Collective Reputations (with Applications to the Persistence of Corruption and to Firm Quality)
On the Theory of Infinitely Repeated Games with Discounting
Subjective Performance Measures in Optimal Incentive Contracts
The Role of Market Forces in Assuring Contractual Performance
Non-Contractual Relations in Business
Occupational Licensure and Regulation
| Citation velocity | historical |
|---|---|
| Highly cited | No |