Information and Strategic Political Polarisation
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 9707932 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Juan D Carrillo (0000-0001-8616-1259, University of Southern California and CEPR), Micael Castanheira (0000-0002-3511-9947, Université Libre de Bruxelles ECARES and CEPR) |
| Year | 2008 |
| Volume | 118 |
| Issue | 530 |
| Pages | 845-874 |
| Publication date | 2008-07-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | The Economic Journal (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0013-0133 • E-ISSN: 1468-0297 |
| Publisher | Oxford University Press (OUP) (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1111/j.1468-0297.2008.02152.x |
| OpenAlex | W3124334689 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 18 |
| References cited | 30 |
We develop a model of electoral competition in which two opportunistic candidates select their policy position and invest in quality. Policy positions are observed and, during the campaign, the press reveals some information about quality. We demonstrate that when information is imperfect, the Black-Downs median voter theorem fails to hold. For intermediate information levels, the unique equilibrium is such that candidates propose policies different from the median voter's bliss point. By contrast, convergence to the median occurs when quality is (almost) always or (almost) never revealed. We also show that a profit-maximising press may collect more information than socially optimal. Copyright © The Author(s). Journal compilation © Royal Economic Society 2008
Business · Political science · Politics · Electoral Systems and Political Participation · Law · Media Influence and Politics · Political Influence and Corporate Strategies
Elections with platform and valence competition
Does a district mandate matter for the behavior of politicians? An analysis of roll-call votes and parliamentary speeches
An empirical analysis of valence in electoral competition
The role of housing in processes of wealth polarisation and de-polarisation in Australia
Why do voters elect less qualified candidates
Equilibrium in a discrete Downsian model given a non-minimal valence advantage and linear loss functions
Policy polarization, primaries, and strategic voters
Electoral Campaigns and Biased Perceptions of Voter Interests
The effect of incumbency on ideological and valence perceptions of parties in multilevel polities
Mixed equilibriums in a three-candidate spatial model with candidate valence
Candidate valence in a spatial model with entry
May increased partisanship lead to convergence of parties’ policy platforms
Income polarisation, expenditure and the Australian urban middle class
Polarization of What? A Model of Elections with Endogenous Valence
On the Nature of Competition in Alternative Electoral Systems
The electoral strategies of a populist candidate
Valence uncertainty and the nature of the candidate pool in elections
Seizing the mantle of change
Political Competition
Partisan Politics, Divided Government, and the Economy
An Economic Model of Representative Democracy
Separation of Powers and Political Accountability
Candidate reputations and the ‘incumbency effect’
Managerial Incentive Problems
Spatial Equilibrium with Entry
Mixed Equilibrium in a Downsian Model with a Favored Candidate
Voting Behavior and Information Aggregation in Elections With Private Information
Political Polarization and Income Inequality
The Theory of Committees and Elections
Mass Media Competition, Political Competition, and Public Policy
Radio's Impact on Public Spending
Incumbent performance and electoral control
An Economic Theory of Political Action in a Democracy
The Instrumental Voter Goes To the Newsagent
Robustness of the Multidimensional Voting Model
Patterns of Congressional Voting
A Model of Candidate Location When One Candidate Has a Valence Advantage
Nebraska Provides for a One-House Legislature
Spatial Models of Party Competition
Candidate Motivation
| Unique citing works | 18 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 1,06 |
| Citation span | 2009 - 2025 (17) |
| Citation velocity | recent |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 18 |