The Timing of Multilateral Lending
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 9708173 |
|---|---|
| Authors | William Perraudin (Bank of England), Anne Sibert (Birkbeck, University of London) |
| Year | 2000 |
| Volume | 110 |
| Issue | 460 |
| Pages | 192-211 |
| Publication date | 2000-01-01 |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | The Economic Journal (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0013-0133 • E-ISSN: 1468-0297 |
| Publisher | Oxford University Press (OUP) (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1111/1468-0297.00496 |
| OpenAlex | W2005792725 |
| Language | EN |
Bargaining over the terms of multilateral lending can be a prolonged process. We model failure to come to quick agreement as a screening device. Policy makers who find conditionality especially costly delay to signal their type. We show that increased costs to not reaching agreement, whether borne by borrowers or lenders, can increase the chances of delay
Business · Conditionality · Economics · International economics · Monetary economics · Political science · Politics · Process (computing · Banking stability, regulation, efficiency · Computer Science · Corporate Finance and Governance · Economic theories and models · Law
| Highly cited | No |
|---|