Noncompete Agreements, Wages and Efficiency
Theory and Evidence from Brazilian Football
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 9708286 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Bernardo Guimaraes (0000-0003-0098-2174, Sao Paulo School of Economics - FGV), Joao Paulo Pessoa (0000-0002-0225-2530, Sao Paulo School of Economics - FGV and CEP-SE), Vladimir Ponczek (0000-0001-7182-4080, Sao Paulo School of Economics - FGV) |
| Year | 2025 |
| Publication date | 2025-10-07 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | The Economic Journal (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0013-0133 • E-ISSN: 1468-0297 |
| Publisher | Oxford University Press (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1093/ej/ueaf103 |
| OpenAlex | W3209264399 |
| Language | EN |
The Pele Act banned noncompete agreements in Brazilian football in 1998. We explore this policy change to study how noncompetes affect the labor market. The Act changed the wage profile heterogeneously, reducing young players’ wages and raising salaries for older ones. Turnover increased slightly. We develop and structurally estimate a model and show that changing the parameter capturing the noncompete friction leads to the changes observed in the data. From the estimation, we recover match efficiency before and after the Act and show that efficiency gains are outweighed by distributional effects
Earnings · Economics · Football · Labour economics · Matching (statistics · Wage · Sports Analytics and Performance · Transport and Economic Policies
| Citation velocity | historical |
|---|---|
| Highly cited | No |