The Rise and Fall of Unionised Labour Markets
A Political Economy Approach
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 9708535 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Woojin Lee (0000-0002-7082-5687, University of Massachusetts Amherst), John E Roemer (0000-0001-9049-5083, Yale University) |
| Year | 2005 |
| Volume | 115 |
| Issue | 500 |
| Pages | 28-67 |
| Publication date | 2005-01-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | The Economic Journal (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0013-0133 • E-ISSN: 1468-0297 |
| Publisher | Oxford University Press (OUP) (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1111/j.1468-0297.2004.00959.x |
| OpenAlex | W2152867968 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 6 |
| References cited | 31 |
Studying a model where trade unions interact with endogenously formed partisan political parties, we explain changing political preferences for and against the unionised labour market regime. We focus on the changes in coalition formation between unskilled and moderately skilled workers, which in turn depend on inequality among workers. When inequality is either very low or very high, moderately skilled workers form a political coalition with unskilled workers to support a unionised labour market regime. In other cases, the economic interest of the moderately skilled workers is more in line with that of highly skilled workers and capital owners to support a competitive labour market regime. Different societies have different labour market regimes or wage determination mechanisms. Some, such as the US, have relatively unregulated labour markets, while others, such as the Northern European countries, have strong trade unions, where wages are set by a collective bargaining procedure mediated through the unions. As Table 1 shows, union density in 1990 ranged over almost the entire spectrum, from 93.7 % in Sweden to 9.3 % in France. Union coverage, defined as the proportion of wage and salary workers covered by terms of a collective bar
Capital (architecture · Economics · Inequality · Labor relations · Labour economics · Market economy · Political science · Politics · Secondary labor market · Split labor market theory · Labor market dynamics and wage inequality · Labor Movements and Unions · Social Policy and Reform Studies
Political Competition
Labor Market Institutions and the Distribution of Wages, 1973-1992
Openness, country size and government
Implications of Skill-Biased Technological Change
Bargaining Structure, Corporatism and Macroeconomic Performance
Changes in Relative Wages, 1963-1987
Unequal Societies
A New Data Set Measuring Income Inequality
Growth, income distribution, and democracy
Promise and Pitfalls in the Use of “Secondary” Data-Sets
New ways of looking at old issues
Globalization and government spending around the world
Why Do More Open Economies Have Bigger Governments
Wage Inequality and the Rise in Returns to Skill
What Limits Social Spending
Union Wage Policy
Globalization, government spending and taxation in the OECD
Centralized Bargaining and Wage Restraint
In Defense of Multiplicative Terms in Multiple Regression Equations
Distributive Politics and Economic Growth
What To Do (and Not to Do) with Time-Series Cross-Section Data
Government Formation and Endogenous Parties
The Expansion of the Public Economy
Politics, Institutions, and Welfare Spending in Industrialized Democracies, 1960-82
Union Organization in Advanced Industrial Democracies
Government Partisanship, Labor Organization, and Macroeconomic Performance
Social Democracy, Christian Democracy, Constitutional Structure, and the Welfare State
| Unique citing works | 6 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 0,3 |
| Citation span | 2006 - 2017 (12) |
| Citation velocity | historical |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 6 |