Corruption and Firm Growth
Evidence from around the World
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 9708542 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Raymond Fisman (0000-0003-1531-6385, Boston University), Sergei Guriev (0000-0001-6048-2169, Institut d'Etudes Politiques de Paris), Carolin Ioramashvili (0000-0002-7776-2105, University of Sussex & London School of Economics , UK), Alexander Plekhanov (0000-0002-9282-9283, European Bank for Reconstructions & Development , UK) |
| Year | 2024 |
| Volume | 134 |
| Issue | 660 |
| Pages | 1494-1516 |
| Publication date | 2024-04-19 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | The Economic Journal (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0013-0133 • E-ISSN: 1468-0297 |
| Publisher | Oxford University Press (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1093/ej/uead100 |
| OpenAlex | W3186932630 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 8 |
| References cited | 26 |
We empirically investigate the relationship between corruption and growth using a firm-level dataset that is unique in scale, covering almost 88,000 firms across 141 economies in 2006–20, with wide-ranging corruption experiences. The scale and detail of our data allow us to explore the corruption-growth relationship at a very local level, within industries in a relatively narrow geography. We report three empirical regularities. First, firms that make zero informal payments tend to grow slower than bribers. Second, this result is driven by non-bribers in high-corruption countries. Third, among bribers, growth is decreasing in the amount of informal payments—in both high- and low-corruption countries. We suggest that this set of results may be reconciled with a simple model in which endogenously determined higher bribe rates lead to lower growth, while non-bribers are often excluded entirely from growth opportunities in high-corruption settings
Development economics · Economics · Empirical evidence · Geography · Language change · Monetary economics · Payment · Scale (ratio · Corruption and Economic Development · Economic Growth and Development · Finance · Taxation and Compliance Studies
Corruption and Capital Investment
Bribery, secrecy, and communication
Measuring spatial patterns with the procurement index of corruption shape
Gender of a manager and firm performance in Africa
Examining the impact of female leadership on small and medium firm performance in post-pandemic India
What corruption is most harmful? Unbundling citizen perceptions
Term limits and corruption
Ressources publiques et intérêts privés
Governance Matters VIII
Relationship-Specificity, Incomplete Contracts, and the Pattern of Trade
Does "Grease Money" Speed Up the Wheels of Commerce?
The Allocation of Talent
Institutional Quality and International Trade
Politically Connected Firms
The Next Generation of the Penn World Table
Corruption
Corruption and Growth
Do Lenders Favor Politically Connected Firms? Rent Provision in an Emerging Financial Market
Who Must Pay Bribes and How Much? Evidence from a Cross Section of Firms
What Are We Weighting For
Are corruption and taxation really harmful to growth? Firm level evidence
Red tape and corruption
Democracy Does Cause Growth
An Equilibrium Queuing Model of Bribery
Firm Growth and Corruption
How Taxing is Corruption on International Investors
Why do Some Countries Produce So Much More Output Per Worker than Others
Big Constraints to Small Firms' Growth? Business Environment and Employment Growth across Firms
| Unique citing works | 8 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 4 |
| Citation span | 2024 - 2026 (3) |
| Citation velocity | current |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 7 |