Deception Through Telling the Truth?! Experimental Evidence from Individuals and Teams
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 9708859 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Matthias Sutter (0000-0002-6143-8706, University of Innsbruck and University of Göteborg, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2009 |
| Volume | 119 |
| Issue | 534 |
| Pages | 47-60 |
| Publication date | 2009-01-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | The Economic Journal (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0013-0133 • E-ISSN: 1468-0297 |
| Publisher | Oxford University Press (OUP) (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1111/j.1468-0297.2008.02205.x |
| OpenAlex | W1970868362 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 40 |
| References cited | 22 |
Informational asymmetries abound in economic decision making and often provide an incentive for deception through telling a lie or misrepresenting information. In this article I use a cheap-talk sender-receiver experiment to show that telling the truth should be classified as deception too if the sender chooses the true message with the expectation that the receiver will not follow the sender's (true) message. The experimental data reveal a large degree of 'sophisticated' deception through telling the truth. The robustness of my broader definition of deception is confirmed in an experimental treatment where teams make decisions. Copyright © The Author(s). Journal compilation © Royal Economic Society 2009
Deception · Media studies · Political science · Psychoanalysis · Public relations · Sociology · Truth telling · Decision-Making and Behavioral Economics · Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies · Game Theory and Applications · Psychology · Social Psychology
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| Unique citing works | 40 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 2,35 |
| Citation span | 2009 - 2025 (17) |
| Citation velocity | recent |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 40 |