Information and Incentives
The Economics of Carrots and Sticks
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 9709166 |
|---|---|
| Authors | James A Mirrlees (University of Cambridge, corresponding author) |
| Year | 1997 |
| Volume | 107 |
| Issue | 444 |
| Pages | 1311-1329 |
| Publication date | 1997-09-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | The Economic Journal (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0013-0133 • E-ISSN: 1468-0297 |
| Publisher | Oxford University Press (OUP) (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1111/j.1468-0297.1997.tb00050.x |
| OpenAlex | W1981734934 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 8 |
| References cited | 24 |
Journal Article Information and Incentives: The Economics of Carrots and Sticks Get access James A. Mirrlees James A. Mirrlees University of Cambridge Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Economic Journal, Volume 107, Issue 444, 1 September 1997, Pages 1311–1329, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0297.1997.tb00050.x Published: 27 January 2012
Economics · Heap (data structure · Ignorance · Incentive · Invisible hand · Microeconomics · Natural (archaeology · Neoclassical economics · Pareto principle · Political science · Positive economics · Profit (economics · Selfishness · Economic theories and models · Economic Theory and Policy · Fiscal Policy and Economic Growth · Law
Rawls’s maximin and optimal taxation theory
From public finance to public economics
Economic Macrojustice
An Exploration of Incentive-Compatible Elie
When Kolm Meets Mirrlees
On Kolm's Theory of Macrojustice
Bunching in rank-dependent optimal income tax schedules
Asymmetric Information and Public Economics
A Critique of Welfare Economics
Regulating a Monopolist with Unknown Costs
Redistributive taxation as social insurance
The design of tax structure
An Exploration in the Theory of Optimum Income Taxation
Aggregation and Linearity in the Provision of Intertemporal Incentives
Theoretical Welfare Economics
Handbook of mathematical economics
Rules Rather than Discretion
A Contribution to the Theory of Taxation
Job Market Signaling
| Unique citing works | 8 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 0,3 |
| Citation span | 1999 - 2023 (25) |
| Citation velocity | historical |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 8 |