The Smoot-Hawley Trade War

Dados Bibliográficos

ID9709271
AutoresKris James Mitchener (Santa Clara University , USA , CASBS, CAGE, CEPR, CES-ifo & NBER), Kevin H O''Rourke (0000-0001-6272-2090, NYU Abu Dhabi , United Arab Emirates , CEPR & NBER), Kevin Hjortshøj O'Rourke (NYU Abu Dhabi , United Arab Emirates , CEPR & NBER), Kirsten Wandschneider (0000-0003-1679-5883, University of Vienna , Austria & CEPR)
Ano2022
Volume132
Fascículo647
Páginas2500-2533
Data de publicação2022-09-19
Peer ReviewedSim
Open AccessSim
TipoARTICLE
PeriódicoThe Economic Journal (JOURNAL)
Identificadores do periódicoISSN: 0013-0133 • E-ISSN: 1468-0297
EditoraOxford University Press (OUP) (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1093/ej/ueac006
IdiomaEN
Citações recebidas5
Referências citadas44

We document the outbreak of a trade war after the United States adopted the Smoot-Hawley tariff in June 1930. U.S. trade partners initially protested, with many eventually choosing to retaliate with tariffs. Using a new quarterly dataset on bilateral trade for ninety-nine countries, we show that U.S. exports to retaliators fell by 28%–32%. Using a second new dataset on U.S. exports at the product level, we find that the most important U.S. exports to retaliating markets were particularly affected, suggesting a possible mechanism whereby the United States was targeted despite most-favoured-nation obligations. The retaliators’ welfare gains from trade fell by 8%–16

China · Economics · Fell · Free trade · Free trade agreement · Geography · International economics · International trade · Legislation · Market economy · Political science · Product (mathematics) · Tariff · Trade war · Welfare · Global trade and economics · Law