Legislative Representation, Bargaining Power and the Distribution of Federal Funds

Evidence from the US Congress

Datos Bibliográficos

ID9710024
AutoresBrian Knight (0000-0001-8049-4749, Brown University, autor de correspondencia)
Año2008
Volumen118
Número532
Páginas1785-1803
Fecha de publicación2008-10-01
Peer ReviewedSí
Open AccessSí
TipoARTICLE
RevistaThe Economic Journal (JOURNAL)
Identificadores de la revistaISSN: 0013-0133 • E-ISSN: 1468-0297
EditorialOxford University Press (OUP) (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1111/j.1468-0297.2008.02191.x
OpenAlexW2169698166
IdiomaEN
Citas recibidas31
Referencias citadas29

This article investigates the relationship between representation in legislatures and the geographic distribution of federal funds. In a legislative bargaining model, we demonstrate that funds are concentrated in high representation areas, and two channels underlie this result. The proposal power channel reflects the role of representation in committee assignments, and the vote cost channel reflects the role of representation in coalition formation. In our empirical analysis, we find that small states, relative to large states, receive more funding in the US Senate, relative to the House. We also find empirical support for the two channels underlying this relationship. Copyright © The Author(s). Journal compilation © Royal Economic Society 2008

Bargaining power · Distribution (mathematics · Economics · Knight · Law and economics · Legislative history · Legislature · Political science · Politics · Power (physics · Representation (politics · Corporate Taxation and Avoidance · Fiscal Policy and Economic Growth · Law · Local Government Finance and Decentralization · Public Administration