Overlending

Dados Bibliográficos

ID9710645
AutoresDavid de Meza (0000-0002-5638-8310, London School of Economics & University of Exeter, autor correspondente)
Ano2002
Volume112
Fascículo477
PáginasF17-F31
Data de publicação2002-02-01
Peer ReviewedSim
Open AccessSim
TipoARTICLE
PeriódicoThe Economic Journal (JOURNAL)
Identificadores do periódicoISSN: 0013-0133 • E-ISSN: 1468-0297
EditoraOxford University Press (OUP) (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1111/1468-0297.00681
OpenAlexW4250277700
IdiomaEN
Citações recebidas24
Referências citadas32

A mass of evidence suggests that aspiring entrepreneurs with low net worth or from disadvantaged social groups are excluded from capital markets. Asymmetric information potentially explains these findings, though whether aggregate lending is raised or lowered relative to the full information outcome is ambiguous. Whichever case occurs, subsidising credit may decrease efficiency. This is all the more true when, as the evidence suggests, potential entrepreneurs are prone to unrealistic optimism. Indeed, even though optimism may cause redlining and credit rationing and so lower lending, the case for policies to encourage lending is further undermined

Capital (architecture · Credit rationing · Disadvantaged · Economic growth · Economics · Interest rate · Monetary economics · Optimism · Rationing · Corporate Finance and Governance · Entrepreneurship Studies and Influences · Private Equity and Venture Capital