Eliciting and Aggregating Information By Sortition in Collective Choice
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 9710690 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Rene Saran (University of Cincinnati and Yale-NUS College, corresponding author), Norovsambuu Tumennasan (0000-0002-5524-397X, Dalhousie University) |
| Year | 2019 |
| Volume | 129 |
| Issue | 620 |
| Pages | 1924-1952 |
| Publication date | 2019-05-01 |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | The Economic Journal (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0013-0133 • E-ISSN: 1468-0297 |
| Publisher | Oxford University Press (OUP) (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1111/ecoj.12616 |
| OpenAlex | W2804272324 |
| Language | EN |
| References cited | 21 |
We study the effectiveness of sortition to elicit and aggregate information that is dispersed among groups of individuals facing a collective choice problem. Sortition is the process of selecting decision-makers by a kleroterion (lottery machine). In environments with private consumption, we identify a large class of kleroteria that is as effective as direct democracy in (fully) implementing social choice functions. Examples include an opinion poll, where a random sample of two (or more) individuals are selected from each group, and ‘oligarchy with random audit’, where the group leaders are ‘audited’ by a randomly selected individual
Economics · Mathematical economics · Microeconomics · Positive economics · Auction Theory and Applications · Game Theory and Applications · Game Theory and Voting Systems
| Highly cited | No |
|---|