Using List Prices to Collude or to Compete
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 9711871 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Diego Cussen (New York University), Juan‐Pablo Montero (0000-0002-6815-0158, Complex Engineering System Institute, corresponding author), Juan-Pablo Montero (Pontificia Universidad Catolica de Chile, Chile, Aalto University, Finland & ISCI) |
| Year | 2024 |
| Volume | 134 |
| Issue | 664 |
| Pages | 3232-3261 |
| Publication date | 2024-11-06 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | The Economic Journal (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0013-0133 • E-ISSN: 1468-0297 |
| Publisher | Oxford University Press (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1093/ej/ueae058 |
| OpenAlex | W4392875091 |
| Language | EN |
| References cited | 27 |
Collusion is deemed unlikely in wholesale markets where upstream suppliers and intermediate buyers privately negotiate discounts off list prices and sales quotas are unfeasible. However, many wholesale markets include both small and large buyers who compete in the retail market. We study the role of publicly announced list prices in this wholesale-retail setting, whether suppliers collude or compete. When suppliers collude, public announcements of list prices extend the possibility of collusion from small to large buyers (the multi-buyer contact effect). When suppliers compete, these announcements provide them with commitment to negotiate better terms with large buyers (the commitment effect)
Business · Collusion · Commerce · Economics · Industrial organization · Microeconomics · Negotiation · Upstream (networking · Auction Theory and Applications · Computer Science · Consumer Market Behavior and Pricing · Merger and Competition Analysis
| Citation velocity | historical |
|---|---|
| Highly cited | No |