Publicity of Debate and the Incentive to Dissent

Evidence from the US Federal Reserve

Dados Bibliográficos

ID9712507
AutoresEllen E Meade (American University), David Stasavage (0000-0001-9964-716X, New York University)
Ano2008
Volume118
Fascículo528
Páginas695-717
Data de publicação2008-04-01
Peer ReviewedSim
Open AccessSim
TipoARTICLE
PeriódicoThe Economic Journal (JOURNAL)
Identificadores do periódicoISSN: 0013-0133 • E-ISSN: 1468-0297
EditoraOxford University Press (OUP) (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1111/j.1468-0297.2008.02138.x
OpenAlexW1579535553
IdiomaEN
Citações recebidas38
Referências citadas20

Transparency in committee decision making may have clear benefits by making members more accountable to outside observers. We consider one potential cost: the possibility that publishing records of deliberations will make members more reluctant to offer dissenting opinions. We construct a model that compares incentives for members with 'career concerns' to voice dissent when deliberations occur in public or in private. We test the model using an original dataset based on deliberations of the Federal Reserve's Federal Open Market Committee, asking whether the FOMC's 1993 decision to begin releasing transcripts of its meetings has altered incentives for dissent. We find evidence that this is indeed the case. Copyright © 2008 The Author(s)

Business · Construct (python library · Dissent · Dissenting opinion · Economics · Ex-ante · Incentive · Law and economics · Microeconomics · Political science · Public relations · Publicity · Publishing · Transparency (behavior · Auditing, Earnings Management, Governance · Corporate Finance and Governance · Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies · Law