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Distributional Implications of Joint Tax Evasion

Bibliographic Data

ID9713396
AuthorsOdd Erik Nygård (Statistics Norway), Joel Slemrod (University of Michigan, corresponding author), Thor O Thoresen (0000-0002-5764-5825, Statistics Norway)
Year2019
Volume129
Issue620
Pages1894-1923
Publication date2019-05-01
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenueThe Economic Journal (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0013-0133 • E-ISSN: 1468-0297
PublisherOxford University Press (OUP) (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1111/ecoj.12619
OpenAlexW3125002068
LanguageEN
Citations received2
References cited36

Both buyers and sellers of goods and services may benefit from letting their economic transactions go unrecorded for tax purposes. The supplier reduces his tax burden by underreporting income and sales, whereas the consumer may gain from buying a non-taxed lower-priced product. The distributional implications of such joint tax evasion depend on the amounts evaded, on where the evaders on both sides of the market are found in the income distribution, and on how the financial gain is split. Our empirical investigations show that the tax evasion-controlled estimate of income inequality in Norway exhibits more income dispersion than official estimates

Distribution (mathematics · Economics · Evasion (ethics · Inequality · Joint (building · Monetary economics · Product (mathematics · Public economics · State income tax · Tax Evasion · Tax reform · Fiscal Policy and Economic Growth · Gender, Labor, and Family Dynamics · Taxation and Compliance Studies

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  • Income tax evasion

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    Open Access•Michael Allingham, Michael G Allingham et al.•Journal of Public Economics•1972

  • Are Household Surveys Like Tax Forms? Evidence from Income Underreporting of the Self-Employed

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  • Quadratic Engel Curves and Consumer Demand

    James Banks, Richard Blundell et al.•The Review of Economics and…•1997

  • Profiles of Tax Non-Compliance among the Self-Employed in Canada

    Herb J Schuetze•Canadian Public Policy•2002

  • Estimates of the Black Economy Based on Consumer Demand Approaches

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  • Nonresponse Rates and Nonresponse Bias in Household Surveys

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  • Cheating Ourselves

    Open Access•Joel Slemrod•The Journal of Economic…•2007

Unique citing works2
Citations per year0,67
Citation span2023 - 2025 (3)
Citation velocityrecent
Highly citedNo
Citation typesNeutral: 2

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