Promises, Threats and Fairness
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 9713665 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Tore Ellingsen (0000-0001-9501-0137, Stockholm School of Economics), Magnus Johannesson (0000-0001-8759-6393, Stockholm School of Economics) |
| Year | 2004 |
| Volume | 114 |
| Issue | 495 |
| Pages | 397-420 |
| Publication date | 2004-04-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | The Economic Journal (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0013-0133 • E-ISSN: 1468-0297 |
| Publisher | Oxford University Press (OUP) (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1111/j.1468-0297.2004.00214.x |
| OpenAlex | W2152695373 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 46 |
| References cited | 38 |
We present experimental evidence that promises and threats mitigate the hold–up problem. While investors rely as much on their own threats as on their trading partner’s promises, the latter are more credible. Building on recent work in psychology and behavioral economics, we then present a simple model within which agents are concerned about both fairness and consistency. The model can account for several of our experimental findings. Its most striking implication is that fairmindedness strengthens the credibility of promises to behave fairly, but weakens the credibility of threats to punish unfair behavior. JEL classification: L14, C78
Business · Consistency (knowledge bases · Credibility · Economics · Law and economics · Microeconomics · Political science · Positive economics · Simple (philosophy · Work (physics · Computer Science · Corruption and Economic Development · Engineering · Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies · Law · Law, Economics, and Judicial Systems
Engagement et incitations
Chapter 8 The Economics of Fairness, Reciprocity and Altruism – Experimental Evidence and New Theories
Gender differences in deception
Preferences for Truth‐Telling
Promises and Partnership
Civic honesty around the globe
Lies in Disguise-an Experimental Study on Cheating
Coordination with Communication Under Oath
Preference Elicitation Under Oath
An Experimental Study of Credible Deviations and ACDC
Referenda Under Oath
Making a promise increases the moral cost of lying
Belief diversity and cooperation
Religion on the Rostrum
When the state does not play dice
AI devices and liability
Promises, Reliance, and Psychological Lock-In
Hold-up induced by demand for fairness
Conformity, reciprocity and the sense of justice. How social contract-based preferences and beliefs explain norm compliance
Who should invest in specific training
Keeping them honest
Counteracting dishonesty strategies
The evolution of morality and the role of commitment
Voluntary Interaction and the Principle of Mutual Benefit
"Removal notice to "Oaths and hypothetical bias
Facta non verba”
Words speak louder than money
How group deliberation shapes distributional preferences
Strategic and social pre-play communication in the ultimatum game
The power of words
Moral emotions and partnership
Voting on a sharing norm in a dictator game
Morality, tax evasion, and equity
Whose promises are worth more? How social status affects trust in promises
The medium or the message? Communication relevance and richness in trust games
Promotion Rules and Skill Acquisition
Fool Me Once
Is Altruism Paternalistic
Trust and Cheating
Fairness and the Optimal Allocation of Ownership Rights
Trust and Truth
Rationalist Experiments on War
An Experimental Investigation of Election Promises
Communication and Guilt in a Prisoner's Dilemma
Communication and fair distribution
Two sword lengths apart
An Introduction to the Bootstrap
A Theory of Cognitive Dissonance
An Introduction to the Bootstrap
A perspective on psychology and economics
Understanding Social Preferences with Simple Tests
Investment and Wages in the Absence of Binding Contracts
An experimental analysis of ultimatum bargaining
Attitudes and Cognitive Organization
Erc
Incorporating Fairness into Game Theory and Economics
Not me or thee but we
A Theory of Cognitive Dissonance
Bootstrap tests
The Size Distortion of Bootstrap Tests
Procurement and Renegotiation
The Costs and Benefits of Ownership
Communication, the Development of Trust, and Cooperative Behavior
On the Relation Between Asset Ownership and Specific Investments
Group correspondence biases and the provision of public goods
Effects of group identity on resource use in a simulated commons dilemma
Communication, commitment, and cooperation in social dilemma
Conversation and Cooperation in Social Dilemmas
A Theory of Fairness, Competition, and Cooperation
An approach to the study of communicative acts
Collective Action and the Evolution of Social Norms
Covenants with and without a Sword
| Unique citing works | 46 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 2,19 |
| Citation span | 2005 - 2026 (22) |
| Citation velocity | current |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 46 |