Collective Choice in the Commons
Experimental Results on Proposed Allocation Rules and Votes
Dados Bibliográficos
| ID | 9713770 |
|---|---|
| Autores | Joanne M Walker (0000-0002-4625-4175, Indiana University), Roy Gardner (Indiana University), Andrew Herr (St Vincent College, Pennsylvania), Elinor Ostrom (Indiana University), Элинор Остром (Indiana University) |
| Ano | 2000 |
| Volume | 110 |
| Fascículo | 460 |
| Páginas | 212-234 |
| Data de publicação | 2000-01-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Sim |
| Open Access | Sim |
| Tipo | ARTICLE |
| Periódico | The Economic Journal (JOURNAL) |
| Identificadores do periódico | ISSN: 0013-0133 • E-ISSN: 1468-0297 |
| Editora | Oxford University Press (OUP) (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1111/1468-0297.00497 |
| OpenAlex | W2063159696 |
| Idioma | EN |
| Citações recebidas | 43 |
| Referências citadas | 14 |
We analyse and empirically examine a multi‐level common‐pool resource (CPR) game consisting of a collective‐choice level game and an operational‐level game. In the collective‐choice game, participants anonymously propose allocation rules to be used in the operational game and vote anonymously on the proposed rules. Majority and unanimity rules are investigated. Our major finding is that both types of voting rules substantially increase efficiency relative to a baseline with no opportunity for collective choice, but the distributional consequences of the rules differ. To understand the process by which efficiency is improved better, we examine four predictive theories related to proposals, votes, and outcomes
Baseline (sea · Common-pool resource · Commons · Economics · Game theory · Majority rule · Microeconomics · Political science · Process (computing · Resource allocation · Sequential game · Tragedy of the commons · Unanimity · Voting · Artificial Intelligence · Auction Theory and Applications · Computer Science · Economic and Environmental Valuation · Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies · Law
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| Obras citantes distintas | 43 |
|---|---|
| Citações por ano | 1,65 |
| Intervalo de citações | 2000 - 2026 (27) |
| Velocidade de citação | current |
| Altamente citado | Não |
| Tipos de citação | Neutras: 42 |