Healthcare Appointments as Commitment Devices
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 9713888 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Laura Derksen (0000-0003-1208-884X, University of Toronto), Jason T Kerwin (0000-0003-3576-2833, University of Washington, USA, IZA, Germany & J-PAL, corresponding author), Natalia Ordaz Reynoso (0000-0001-7963-9912, Bocconi University), Olivier Sterck (0000-0003-3835-9388, University of Oxford, UK & University of Antwerp) |
| Year | 2024 |
| Volume | 135 |
| Issue | 665 |
| Pages | 81-118 |
| Publication date | 2024-12-09 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | The Economic Journal (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0013-0133 • E-ISSN: 1468-0297 |
| Publisher | Oxford University Press (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1093/ej/ueae077 |
| OpenAlex | W4401501971 |
| Language | EN |
| References cited | 92 |
We show that ordinary appointments can act as effective substitutes for hard commitment devices and increase demand for a critical healthcare service, particularly among those with self-control problems. We show this using an experiment that randomly offered HIV testing appointments and hard commitment devices to high-risk men in Malawi. Appointments more than double testing rates, with effects concentrated among those who demand commitment. In contrast, most men who take up hard commitments lose their investments. Appointments overcome commitment problems without the potential drawback of commitment failure, and have the potential to increase demand for healthcare in the developing world
Business · Commerce · Control (management · Developing country · Economic growth · Economics · Family medicine · Health care · Human immunodeficiency virus (HIV · Management · On demand · Public economics · Service (business · Economic and Environmental Valuation · Global Maternal and Child Health · Healthcare Policy and Management · Marketing · Medicine
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| Citation velocity | historical |
|---|---|
| Highly cited | No |