The Welfare State as Provider of Accident Insurance in the Workplace
Efficiency and Distribution in Equilibrium
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 9714359 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Alf Erling Risa (University of Bergen, corresponding author) |
| Year | 1995 |
| Volume | 105 |
| Issue | 428 |
| Pages | 129 |
| Publication date | 1995-01-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | The Economic Journal (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0013-0133 • E-ISSN: 1468-0297 |
| Publisher | Oxford University Press (OUP) (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.2307/2235323 |
| OpenAlex | W1993059770 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 1 |
| References cited | 7 |
The welfare state provides universal insurance for workers against accidents in the workplace. In equilibrium, this insurance does not generate adverse safety incentives to firms. Non-internalised insurance makes workers sort themselves nonoptimally to firms, and to choose higher individual effort levels to prevent accidents as compared to insurance schemes that are internalised in the market. Welfare state insurance may therefore generate higher safety levels than perfect experience rating, not lower. An optimal income taxation scheme in the welfare state implies progressive taxation. The optimal tax level increases with the extent of the welfare state
Accident (philosophy · Actuarial science · Business · Distribution (mathematics · Economics · Incentive · Labour economics · Market economy · Microeconomics · Public economics · State (computer science · Welfare · Welfare state · Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies · Law · Law, Economics, and Judicial Systems · Taxation and Compliance Studies
| Unique citing works | 1 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 0,05 |
| Citation span | 2006 - 2006 (1) |
| Citation velocity | historical |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 1 |